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CRIMINAL LAW IN MISSOURIMANSLAUGHTER, A PROBLEM OF DEFINITION*
EDWARD H. HUNVALD, JR.**

The law of homicide may be regarded as definitely established in
this State by a series of well considered and consistent decisions,
and it ought not to be unsettled or varied without gross mistakes
have been made. Supreme Court of Missouri in State v. Starr
(1866) *1
Four recent decisions by the Supreme Court of Missouri indicate that
the established law of homicide may be neither well considered nor consistent. All four of these cases involve the propriety of giving an instruction
on manslaughter when the defendant is on trial for murder. This was also
one of the questions before the court in State v. Starr2 and it has recurred
with considerable frequency during the nearly one hundred years since the
sentiment quoted above was expressed. 3
In criminal trials the court is required to instruct the jury "upon all
questions of law necessary for their guidance."- Consequently, if the charge
is murder and the evidence is such that the jury could justifiably find the
defendant guilty of manslaughter, the court must instruct on manslaughter.
If the evidence is such that the jury could not properly find the defendant
guilty of manslaughter, then no instruction ought to be given on the subject.
When is the evidence such that a manslaughter instruction ought to be
given, or, in other words, what is manslaughter? The statutory definition
provides very little assistance.
* This article contains a discussion of selected 1960 and 1961 Missouri court
decisions reported in volumes 335-347, South Western Reporter, Second Series.
**Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri; A.B., Princeton, 1950;
LL.B., Harvard, 1953.
1. 38 Mo. 270, 272 (1866).
2. The court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on
manslaughter "where death ensues in a combat upon provocation sought by the
slayer ... ." Id. at 277.
3. For cases arising in 1959-1960, see Hunvald, Criminal Law in Missouri,
25 Mo. L. REv. 369, 378-80 (1960). "A man who cites himself never lacks authority," Old Hungarian Proverb.
4. Mo. R. Crim. P. § 26.02(6), RSMo 1959. See also § 546.070(4), RSMo
1959.
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Every killing of a human being by the act, procurement or culpable
negligence of another, not herein declared to be murder or excusable or justifiable homicide, shall be deemed manslaughter.5
Thus, to know what manslaughter is, it is necessary to define murder.
Murder, by the statutory definition is divided into degrees.
Every murder which shall be committed by means of poison, or
by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, and every homicide which shall be committed in
the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or mayhem, shall be deemed murder in the first
degree.,
All other kinds of murder at common law, not herein declared to
homicide, shall be
be manslaughter or justifiable or excusable
7
deemed murder in the second degree.
With the exception
statutes are of no help
not manslaughter, and
and neither exists if the

of those homicides which are felony murders, these
for they state that murder is a homicide which is
manslaughter is a homicide which is not murder,
homicide is justifiable or excusable.8 The definition

5. § 559.070, RSMo 1959. An indication that this definition has not been
adequate is found in the existence of a number of special manslaughter statutes:
§ 559.080, RSMo 1959 (assisting in self-murder), § 559.100, RSMo 1959 (abortion),
§ 559.110, RSMo 1959 (death from vicious animal), § 559.120, RSMo 1959 (manslaughter by intoxicated physician), § 559.130, RSMo 1959 (by railroad conductors, engineers, steamboat pilots and others).
6. § 559.010, RSMo 1959.
7. § 559.020, RSMo 1959.
8. Section 559.040, RSMo 1959, provides:
Homicide shall be deemed justifiable when committed by any person in
either of the following cases: (1) In resisting any attempt to murder
such person, or to commit any felony upon him or her, or in any dwelling
house in which such person shall be; or (2) When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of his or her husband or wife, parent, child,
brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, master, mistress, apprentice
or servant, when there shall be reasonable cause to apprehend a design
to commit a felony, or to do some great personal injury, and there shall
be reasonable cause to apprehend immediate danger of such design being
accomplished; or (3) When necessarily committed in attempting by lawful ways and means to apprehend any person for any felony committed,
or in lawfully suppressing any riot or insurrection, or in lawfully keeping
or preserving the peace.
Section 559.050, RSo 1959, provides:
Homicide shall be deemed excusable when committed by accident or
misfortune, in either of the following cases: (1) In lawfully correcting a
child, apprentice or servant, or in doing any other lawful act by lawful
means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without unlawful intent; or
(2) In heat of passion, upon any sudden or sufficient provocation, or upon
sudden combat, without any undue advantage being taken, and without
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/6
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must then be found in case law, as the statutes do little more than declare
that murder and manslaughter are crimes.
An intentional homicide, for which there is no justification or excuse,
will usually be murder. If, however, the killing was committed in the "heat
of passion" brought on by an "adequate provocation" and before a sufficient "cooling time" had elapsed, the crime is "reduced" to manslaughter."

When is the evidence such that the court, in a trial for murder, should give
an instruction on this type of manslaughter?
In State v. Wiigkt10 the defendant, a woman, admitted that she had
killed the deceased and had done so intentionally. She claimed, however,
that she was acting in self-defense in repelling the deceased's attempt to
satisfy his sexual desires; this attempt being coupled with threats of bodily
barm if she did not acquiesce. The deceased, appropriately enough, was
named "Mann." The court gave an instruction on self-defense but declined
to instruct on manslaughter, apparently feeling that there was no evidence
upon which a jury could return such a verdict. Prior decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court indicated that a threat of serious bodily harm is not
adequate provocation unless there is physical violence, that is, at least a
touching of the defendant by the -deceased."1
The only physical touching in the Wright case occurred in the front
seat of Mann's automobile when he put his arm around the defendant1 2 and
unzipped his trousers. The defendant then got out of the car, went around
to the window on the driver's side and told Mann not to bother her and
that she did not want to see him anymore. Mann replied that she had
any dangerous weapon being used, and not done in a cruel and unusual
manner.
In addition, Section 559.060, RSMo 1959, provides:
Whenever it shall appear to any jury, upon the trial of any person indicted for murder or manslaughter, that the alleged homicide was committed under circumstances or in any case where, by any statute or the
common law, such homicide was justifiable or excusable, the jury shall
return a general verdict of not guilty. (Emphasis added.)
While the statutes defining excusable and justifiable homicide are more positive
than those defining murder and manslaughter these statutes are not too clearly
worded nor are they all-inclusive for § 559.060, RSMo 1959, indicates that there
are still in force the common law rules of justification and excuse.
9. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 43 (1957). To say that the crime is "reduced"
to manslaughter is, of course, saying nothing more than that it is manslaughter.

10. 336 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. 1960).
11. State v. Bongard, 330 Mo. 805, 814, 51 S.W.2d 84, 88 (1932), and cases
cited therein; State v. Haynes, 329 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Mo. 1959), and cases cited
therein.
12. The defendant was not too clear as to whether Mann put or attempted

to put his arm around her. State v. Wright, supra note 10, at 716.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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better get back into the car and reached toward the glove compartment
wherein defendant knew he kept a gun. Defendant then shot her Mann.?s
Left only with the choice of finding murder or no crime at all, the
jury returned a verdict of guilty of second degree murder. On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed because of the failure of the trial court to instruct
on manslaughter. The court stated that the touching in the automobile
brought the facts "at least technically"'" within the physical violence rule.
The court found an additional basis for ruling that there was adequate
provocation by reasoning that if a close male relative of the defendant had
discovered Mann attempting to have illicit sexual relations with the defendant, this discovery would be adequate provocation for the male relative, and therefore, as far as the defendant is concerned:
[T]he law should not put her in a less favorable position as regards
provocation than that which would be occupied by her near male
relative who had slain immediately upon discovery of the offending
conduct. Why would it not generate heat of passion where a
woman bent upon bringing about a cessation of her illicit sexual
relations meets an equally determined counterforce on the part
of her paramour or the former recipient of her favors, and the man
nevertheless undertakes to violate her person?15
Then returning to the question of physical violence, the court continued:
If, as in the classic examples so often referred to in the cases cited
above, "a mere tweaking of the nose" or the "comparative harmless
jostling of a person on the highway" may be sufficient to constitute
lawful provocation, then how much more grievous was Mann's
amorous advance by way of actually putting his arm around defendant and unzipping his trousers.1While one might agree that a homicide under these circumstances,
13. Those who are offended by this poor pun should consider the admirable

restraint shown by not discussing the plight of the female defendant who was
"(Wright."
14. State v. Wright, supra note 10, at 717.
15. Ibid. As might be suspected from this quotation, this was not the first
contact between the defendant and Mann. Defendant admitted that she and Mann
had had sexual relations during a period of from four to five years. She claimed
that these relations began at the point of a gun and continued only because of
threats by Mann that he would kill her or disclose the existence of their relationship to defendant's husband and the community. Defendant also claimed that she
had had nothing to do with Mann for the six month period preceding the killing
and that Mann had made threats against defendant during that period. These
were also the reasons why the defendant armed herself before going to meet Mann
for the last time.
16. Ibid.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/6
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although still a crime, ought not to be murder, and that the provocation
ought to be considered legally sufficient to entitle the defendant to a manslaughter instruction, the logic of the opinion is somewhat short of overwhelming.
Since "tweaking" and "jostling" are adequate provocation, the court
reasons that undesired amorous advances should also be adequate provocation, as these are "much more grievous" and more likely to bring on heat
of passion in a reasonable man (woman). If this is so, then should not
the apparent threat of serious bodily harm without a physical touching also
be adequate provocation as this also is far more likely to cause the severe
emotional upset in a reasonable man than a mere tweaking or jostling? Yet,
one year before, the court specifically rejected (and not for the first time)
the proposition that such a threat without a touching could be considered
7
as adequate provocation.1
Moreover, if in adjudging the existence of adequate provocation, we
must view the defendant not only in the uncomfortable position in which
she finds herself, but also must consider how provoked she would be if she
were her own near male relative discovering herself in her embarassing circumstances, then should we not also treat a person who fears a serious bodily
harm from another (although there has been no touching) in the same
position as a near relative who comes upon the scene and kills the apparent
attacker?18
Rather than relying on the doubtful authority of the "classic examples"
of tweaking and jostling 9 or upon the gymnastics of putting a person in the
17. State v. Haynes, supra note 11.
18. Cf., State v. Johnson, 6 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1928).
19. See, e.g., State v. Kloss, 117 Mo. 591, 601, 23 S.W. 780, 783-84 (1893).
The two "classic examples" are probably apocryphal. Their first appearance in Missouri jurisprudence was in State v. Starr, supra note 1, at 277:
There must be an assault upon the person as where the provocation was
by pulling the nose, purposely jostling the slayer aside in the highway
(Lannusses' case, 1 Hale P. C.455) or other direct and actual batteryRex v. Stedman, Foster 292.
1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 455 (1736), makes no mention of nose pulling but
does cite the example of jostling another to take the wall. There is no mention of
"Lannusses' case," but there is a reference to "17 Car. 1 Lanure's cafe," which
becomes "Lambe's case, 17 Chas. 1, 1641 or 1642" in 3 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW

OF

ENGLAND

62 (1883), and which apparently deals with provoca-

tion by the whipping of a horse upon which the slayer is riding. Stedman's case
(1704) as reported in

FOsTER, CROWN CASES

292 (1809), deals with neither tweak-

ing nor jostling, but instead with the proposition that if a woman boxes a man's
ear, this is insufficient provocation, but if she strikes him with an "iron patten,"
this is sufficient provocation.
The nose pulling example appears in 4

BLACKSTONE,

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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position of a near male relative stumbling upon the scene, would it not be
better to rule that the threat of attack (without a touching) can be adequate
provocation and thus recognize that such a threat can cause a reasonable
person to lose his self-control, act hastily and kill without adequate reflection ?20
While the Wriglt case may have reached a proper result2l it indicates
the difficulty of reaching this result in a framework of rules which arbitrarily limit adequate provocation to a small list of specific situations,2 2
without regard to the reasons why some intentional homicides, although
(Christian ed. 1822), "So also if a man be greatly provoked, as by pulling his nose,
or other great indignity . . . ." and in EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 233 (1806).
The authority cited for this proposition is Regina v. Mawgridge, Kelyng 119, 135,
84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1114 (Q.B. 1706), and there it is dictum and there is no citation to any case. ".... if one man upon angry words shall make an assault upon
another, either by pulling him by the nose, or filliping upon the forehead .... "
Nose pulling became "tweaking" and jostling aside in the highway became
"comparatively harmless jostling of a person on the highway" in State v. Bongard,
supra note 11 at 814, 51 S.W.2d at 89, a decision which proclaimed the minimum
standard for provocation to be personal violence. This decision seems to confuse
the question of provocation by insulting words or gestures and provocation by
threat of serious bodily harm and arrives at the conclusion that neither is adequate
provocation unless there is a physical touching.
Cf., 1 HALE, op. cit. supra; at 456, discussing a case in which a court (with a
dissent) ruled that fighting words are not adequate provocation, "'but it was there
held, that words of menace of bodily harm would come within the reafon of fuch
a provocation, as would make the offenfe to be but manflaughter."
It is submitted that the "classic examples" are examples of the proposition
that insults by words or gestures are not adequate provocation, but that insults
coupled with a nose pulling, or the highly insulting, but not harmful conduct of
pushing another into the gutter are such that they could be sufficient provocation.
tis doubtful if these "insults" should be adequate provocation today, and also
doubtful if they have any bearing on the question of whether an assault (without
a touching) can be an adequate provocation.
20. Cf., MORELAND, THE 'LAW OF HOMICIDE 75, 77 (1952).
21. It is interesting to note that the court does not discuss the sufficiency of
the evidence on the question of the existence of heat of passion, but merely
assumes that once there is an adequate provocation, an instruction on manslaughter
must be given, no matter what the evidence or lack of it is on the question of
passion. Apparently, once the adequate provocation is shown, there is sufficient
evidence of heat of passion to justify the submission of manslaughter to the jury.
22. For a listing based on Missouri cases, see Cisel, Sumvmary of Criminal
Homicide in Missouri, 2 U. KAN. CITy L. REv. 25 (1933). See also MORELAND,
op. cit. .rpranote 20, at 68-69:
It is interesting that the list is so short, not over four or five acts are
sufficient legal provocation to raise such heat of passion as to constitute
a homicide manslaughter rather than murder. It may well be queried
whether this is because our society considers that these are the only
provocations which should justify such a reduction in the crime or whether
it is because these are the provocations which were considered sufficient
as the law was developing and crystallizing and the list has never seriously
been questioned since.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/6
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still crimes, ought not to be as serious as murder. 23
As the Wright case indicates, the failure to give an instruction on
manslaughter when the evidence will support a finding of manslaughter is
reversible error.24 Is it error to instruct on manslaughter when there is no
evidence to support such a finding? If the jury convicts the defendant of
murder, it is difficult to see how he has been harmed by an uncalled for
manslaughter instruction.25 But if the jury finds the defendant guilty of
manslaughter when the evidence shows that he is either guilty of murder
or of no crime at all, should the conviction be reversed on appeal?
This problem arose in State v. Chamineak.28 As in the Wright case the
defendant who was charged with murder admitted the killing and claimed
self-defense. However, there was no evidence of prior physical violence nor

23. Cf. Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II, 37
CoLuM. L. REV. 1261, 1281 (1937):
Provocation may be greater or less, but it cannot be measured by the
intensity of the passions aroused in the actor by the provocative circumstances. It must be estimated by the probability that such circumstances
would affect most men in like fashion; although the passions stirred up
in the actor were violent, the provocation can be said to be great only if
the provocative circumstances would have aroused in most men similar
desires of comparable intensity. Other things being equal, the greater the
provocation, measured in that way, the more ground there is for attributing
the intensity of the actor's passions and his lack of self-control on the
homicidal occasion to the extraordinary character of the situation in
which he was placed rather than to any extraordinary deficiency in his
own character. While it is true, it is also beside the point, that most men
do not kill on even the gravest provocation; the point is that the more
strongly they would be moved to kill by circumstances of the sort which
provoked the actor to the homicidal act, and the more difficulty they
would experience in resisting the impulse to which he yielded, the less
does his succumbing serve to differentiate his character from theirs.
Cf. also MODEL PENAL CoDE § 201.3 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959):

Criminal Homicide constitutes manslaughter when:
(a) ....
(b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is commited under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which
there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such
explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person
in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.
24. ". . . [B]ut if there was substantial evidence tending to show that defendant had lawful provocation, then he was entitled to a manslaughter instruction
irrespective of whether such was requested." State v. Martin, 336 S.W.2d 394, 398
(Mo. 1960).
25. If the giving of the instruction was error the defendant cannot complain
of error that was not prejudicial. Mo. R. Crim. P. § 24.11, RSMo 1959; § 543.030
(18), RSMo 1959.
26. 343 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1961). See also State v. Chamineak, 328 S.W.2d
10 (Mo. 1959) (conviction of second degree murder for same homicide reversed
because of failure to instruct on self-defense).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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of any other type of provocation heretofore considered to be adequate.
If the trial court had refrained from giving an instruction on manslaughter,
it would not have been error.2 But the trial court did give an instruction
on manslaughter, and the jury convicted of that offense. The conviction
was affirmed. The Supreme Court stated that there was clearly sufficient
evidence to support a conviction of second degree murder, and "the defendant is not entitled to complain that a submissible case was not made
as to a lesser degree of homicide.1'28 If this means that a conviction based
on insufficient evidence shall be affirmed solely on the ground that there
was sufficient evidence to support another crime (of which the defendant
was not convicted), then the defendant would appear to have an excellent
claim that he has been deprived of due process.2 9
The ruling was based on a statute which provides that a defendant
cannot claim error "because the evidence shows or tends to show him to
be guilty of a higher offense than that of which he is convicted."3S It is
quite logical to say that the defendant cannot disclaim liability for a crime
on the ground that he is guilty of a greater offense, but this should not
preclude him from appealing on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence
as to the very offense of which he was convicted.
If the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilty as to both
offenses, the defendant should not be allowed to complain because the jury
chose one and not the other. For example, on a charge of robbery, the
defendant cannot complain of a conviction of larceny solely on the grounds
that the evidence also showed him guilty of robbery, for the evidence
sufficient to constitute robbery will of necessity be sufficient for larceny,
as larceny is a lesser included offense of robbery.31 It would seem then that
the statute could not apply unless the evidence were sufficient to convict

27. State v. Haynes, sutpra note 11; State v. Finn, 243 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1951);
State v. Clay, 201 Mo. 679, 100 S.W. 439 (1907).
28. State v. Chamineak, supra note 26, at 157.
29. Cf. Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
30. § 545.030(17), RSMo 1959. Cf. Mo. R. Crim. P. § 24.11, RSMo 1959. In
addition, § 556.220, RSMo 1959 provides:
any person found guilty of murder in the second degree, of any degree
of manslaughter, shall be punished according to the verdict of the jury,
although the evidence in the case shows him to be guilty of a higher
degree of homicide.
See also § 556.230, RSMo 1959, which provides for conviction of a lesser included
offense.
31. State v. Lasky, 133 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1939); State v. Weinhardt, 253
Mo. 629, 161 S.W. 1151 (1913).
...

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/6
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of the lower offense, that is, unless the lower offense were "included" in
2
the higher.
An offense is "included" in another when all of its elements are also
elements of the other offense, or, stated differently, when the facts necessary
to support a conviction of the other, higher offense will also support a
conviction of the lower, "included" offense. 33
Is manslaughter a lesser included offense within murder. Are the
elements of manslaughter also the elements of murder? Murder can be
defined as a homicide with malice". and manslaughter as an unlawful
homicide without malice. "Unlawful" here means without justification or
excuse. Thus it can be argued that the only difference between the crimes
of manslaughter and murder is the presence of "malice" in the latter,35 and
consequently manslaughter is a lesser included offense. Such an analysis
provides a simple answer to the question, but unfortunately the analysis
turns out to be meaningless, in that it does nothing more than state that
all homicides are either murder, manslaughter, justifiable or excusable.
First of all, malice is a technical word and is little more than the
name given to those states of mind sufficient for murder. For example, an
"intent to kill" may be sufficient for malice. But not all such intents are
32. State v. Willard, 228 Mo. 328, 341, 128 S.W. 749, 753 (1910) (conviction of third degree forgery reversed):
The old familiar and well-recognized rule that a defendant cannot complain of conviction for a lower grade of the crime when the testimony
tends to show him guilty of a higher grade can only be maintained upon
the theory that in the charge of the higher grade of crime the lower
grade is necessarily embraced.
33. As to whether the existence of a "lesser included offense" is determined
by the statutory definition of the greater offense or by the matters alleged in the
information or indictment, see People v. Marshall, 309 P.2d 456 (1957), noted
45 CALIF. L. REv. 534 (1957), 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 93 (1957).
34. The traditional phrase is "malice aforethought," but the latter word adds
nothing to the present meaning. See PERKINS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 30.
35. Cf. State v. Foster, 355 Mo. 577, 591, 197 S.W.2d 313, 320 (1946):
Assignment 23 in the motion predicated error on the inclusion in instruction No. 2 of the phrases 'without malice' and 'without premeditation,'
and asserted they were not necessary elements of the crime of manApparently it attempts to
slaughter and tended to confuse the jurors ....
say the absence of malice and premeditation are not necessary elements
of manslaughter, or conversely, that the crime may still 'be manslaughter
although they are present. This is not the law. Malice is an essential
ingredient of murder, and if that element be present the homicide cannot
be manslaughter; and premeditation (but not deliberation) is a necessary
element of murder in the second degree.
Cf. also, State v. Parker, 355 Mo. 916, 923, 199 S.W.2d 338, 341 (1947): "The
existence or nonexistence of malice determines whether homicide is murder or
manslaughter."
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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malice. A man who kills in self-defense intends to kill, but this is not
murder. The public executioner who pulls the switch for the electric chair
or pushes the button for the gas chamber intends to kill, but this is not
murder. A man who kills in the heat of passion brought on by an adequate
provocation intends to kill, but this is not murder. But the man who kills
in the heat of passion brought on by an inadequate provocation does commit murder and his intent to kill is malice. It is difficult, if not impossible,
to distinguish on a subjective level, the states of mind of the last two
examples, yet one is malice and the other is not. In short, an intent to
kill is sufficient for malice unless there are circumstances of justification,
excuse or mitigation. If there is justification or excuse, the homicide is
an innocent one; if there is mitigation, the crime is manslaughter.
To thus define murder as a homicide with malice is to define it as a
homicide without excuse, justification or mitigation. Manslaughter defined as an unlawful homicide without malice becomes an unlawful homicide under circumstances of mitigation. Mitigation turns out to be those
circumstances which the law deems sufficient to make an unlawful homicide
not murder-for example, a killing in the heat of passion brought on by
36. Malice includes other states of mind in addition to an intent to kill. At
one time the meaning was "a deliberate intent to kill formed prior to the fatal
act. But its meaning has since been expanded by a series of extensions in the law
until it has acquired a number of meanings and the term has become so ambiguous
as to 'be not only valueless but misleading. Fortunately, in the case of murder,
Stephen and others have broken down the phrase into categories which describe
realistically the various states of mind or types of conduct which constitute 'malice
aforethought' as the term is used in that offense"' MoRELAND, op. cit. s.pra note
20, at 60-61.
Malice aforethought means any one or more of the following states of
mind preceding or co-existing with the act or omission by which death
is caused, and it may exist where that act is unpremeditated.
(a) An intention to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to,
some person, whether such person is the person actually killed or not.
(b) Knowledge that the act which causes death will probably cause
the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, some person, whether such person
is the person actually killed or not, although such knowledge is accompanied by indifference whether death or grievous bodily harm is caused
or not, or by a wish that it may not be caused.
(c) An intent to commit any felony whatever.
(d) An intent to oppose by force any officer of justice on his way to
or returning from the execution of the duty of arresting, keeping in
custody, or imprisoning any person whom he is lawfully entitled to arrest,
keep in custody, or imprison, or the duty of keeping the peace, or dispersing an unlawful assembly, provided that the offender has notice that
the person killed in such an officer so employed. 3 STEPHEN, HISTORY oF
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 80-81 (1883).
For a discussion of the continuation and modifications of these categories, see Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537 (1934).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/6
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an adequate provocation and before an adequate cooling time has elapsed.
Each crime is defined in terms of the other, and this definition is circular
and meaningless.
Is manslaughter factually a lesser included offense of murder? Will
the facts necessary to support a conviction of murder also support a conviction of manslaughter?
Taking as an example the case of an intentional killing, it would seem
that voluntary (intentional) manslaughter requires proof of several facts
not necessary for murder, that is, facts which would show that there was
adequate provocation and heat of passion. But it is a mistake to conclude
from this that manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of murder.
The problem is complicated by the presumption of malice. The law presumes that intentional homicides have been committed with malice. 3s
This means that in the absence of evidence indicating the existence of
justification, excuse or mitigation, these matters are presumed not to exist,
and it is incumbent upon the defendant to bring forward evidence to
indicate their existence rather than the state being required to bring
forward evidence showing their nonexistence. 39 If there is no evidence of
these matters, then the jury should not be instructed regarding them.
The net result of all of this is that it is possible to conclude that
voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder (from an
intentional killing) since an intentional killing can be murder or it can be
manslaughter if circumstances of mitigation are present. However, it is

37. Cf.

MORELAND, Op. cit. supra note 20, at 60-63:
To say, as the courts continue to do, "Manslaughter includes all unlawful homicides committed without malice aforethought" is to use a
definition which does not define. It amounts to no more than saying, "All
unlawful homicides which are not murder are manslaughter."
38. The rule is often stated as requiring as a premise, an intentional killing
with a deadly weapon. Cf. State v. Smith, 240 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Mo. 1951); State
v. Whited, 360 Mo. 956, 960, 231 S.W.2d 618, 620 (1950); State v. Fitzgerald,
130 Mo. 407, 435, 32 S.W. 1113, 1116 (1895); State v. Gassert, 65 Mo. 352, 354
(1877). See also MORELAND, op. cit. supra note 20, at 21.
39. Cf. State v. Whited, supra note 38, at 620-21:
"Malice is an essential ingredient of murder." And malice and second degree murder are presumed from proof of an intentional killing with a deadly
weapon. However, this proof is only prima facie evidence of malice. "The
ordinary result of the use of" a deadly weapon "raises a presumption of
malice and shifts the burden of proof to repel the inference of same to
the accused, -uness the evidence proving the killing shows its absence."
Here the uncontradicted evidence shows the absence of malice and destroys
the presumption. (Citations omitted without indication).
See also State v. Evans, 124 Mo. 397, 411, 28 S.W. 8, 12 (1894).
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also clear that the court should not instruct on manslaughter unless there
is evidence of mitigation.
One argument to support the result of the Chramineak case is that the
improper instruction on manslaughter is error but it is error committed in
defendant's favor. 40 If the trial court were to err and give an instruction on
self-defense, the defendant would be in no position to complain. But to argue that an erroneous instruction on manslaughter is also favorable since
both self-defense and manslaughter involve the negation of malice ignores
the fact that if the jury improperly finds self-defense, the defendant is
acquitted, but if the jury improperly finds manslaughter, the defendant is
convicted of a felony. To allow such a conviction to stand is a benefit to
the defendant only when he was in fact guilty of murder. If the jury had
been left with only the proper choice of murder or acquittal, they might well
have acquitted the defendant.
Our present approach allows for a compromise verdict to be affirmed,
even though a compromise verdict can be unfair to both the state and
the defendant. As it now stands, if there is no evidence to support a
finding of manslaughter, the defendant cannot complain if an instruction
is not given. Neither can he complain if an instruction is given. Such an
approach may in fact result in justice being done, but it has not been demonstrated that it does so.
Although compromise verdicts are never desirable, the chances of a
miscarriage of justice would be reduced if the opportunity for such a compromise were limited to intentional killings. That is, if in order to convict
of manslaughter the jury were required by the instructions to find that
the defendant intended to kill (and was in the heat of passion). Then,
assuming the jury followed the instructions and found an intent to kill,
the compromise would always be in the defendant's favor, as they should
have found him to be guilty of murder if they found an intent to kill.
Unfortunately, the instructions given by the trial court do not necessarily make it clear to the jury what facts must be found for manslaughter.
Manslaughter was correctly defined in the instruction to be the
killing of a human being not herein declared to be murder or ex4
cusable or justifiable homicide. "
40. Cf. State v. Todd, 194 Mo. 377, 384, 92 S.W. 674, 679 (1906), dealing
with an alleged error in instructing on second degree murder. The evidence, however, was sufficient to support a finding of guilty of either degree of murder.
41. State v. Chamineak, 343 S.W.2d 153, 164 (Mo. 1961).
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In other words, the choice improperly left to the jury in the Chamineak
case was that they could return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter if
they did not find the killing to be something else, but without any useful
guide to the meaning of manslaughter. The jury, in effect, is told: "If you
do not want to convict of murder, nor acquit, then you can return a
' 2
verdict of guilty of manslaughter. Intentional killings in the heat of passion are, of course, not the
only homicides that are manslaughter. Manslaughter also includes unintentional homicides and the question arises as to when, in a trial for
murder, an instruction on manslaughter by an unintentional homicide
should be given. Manslaughter by an unintentional homicide is broken
down into two categories: homicides which result from culpable negligence" 8 and homicides during the commission of an unlawful act not
44
amounting to a felony.
i 45
the defendant attempted to secure a reversal
In State v. Ctreatham
on the ground that the trial court erred in
murder
of
of his conviction
not giving an instruction on manslaughter. The State's evidence to show
murder was provided primarily by the testimony of Sheila, aged ten, a

42. Another indication of the lack of meaning in the term "manslaughter" is
found in the court's treatment of defendant's claim of error in that the trial court
refused to allow him to testify that he did not intend to kill the deceased. The
court agreed that this was an error but gave as one of the reasons why it was
not prejudicial:
[Djefendant was not found guilty of second degree murder, the offense
charged in the indictment, but was found guilty of manslaughter. An
intent to kill is an essential element of murder in the second degree. That
is, the killing, among other things, must be wilful. But while there may
exist such an intent it is not an indispensable element of manslaughter.
For this reason, the verdict cured the error, if any. (Citation omitted
without indication). Id. at 161.
A better reason for this result is found in the court's statement:
We also note that it is somewhat incongruous for defendant to say that
he did not intend to kill Harold Hogan when he intentionally shot him
in the head with a shotgun from a distance of five or six feet. Id. at 161.
43. This type of manslaughter is most commonly found in cases dealing with
criminal homicide resulting from automobile accidents. For two recent examples,
see State v. Feger, 340 S.W.2d 716 (Mo. 1960), and State v. Fennewald, 339
S.W.2d 769 (Mo. 1960). The latter case involves the liability of a driver whose
car was not involved in the accident but who was engaged at the time in a
"drag race" with the car that was involved in the accident. The case contains a
very interesting discussion of the problem of joint liability for an unintentional
homicide.
44. For a classic and extreme example of this type of manslaughter, see State
v. Frazier, 339 Mo. 966, 98 S.W.2d 707 (1936), discussed in HALL, PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW 259-60 (2d ed. 1960).
45. 340 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1960).
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daughter of the deceased.40 The deceased was a woman with whom the
defendant had been living but to whom he was not married. According
to Sheila's eyewitness account, defendant tried to bit the deceased's head
against the side of a tub in the bathroom. He then hit her in the back
with his fist, put his foot in her back and stomped on her head with
his bare feet. He then dragged the deceased by her collar to a bed, tore
off her clothes and begain going through her wallet. Defendant then noticed Sheila observing the scene and told her to go to bed. Sheila dutifully
complied. When Sheila awoke later she found her mother, the deceased,
on the floor with blood running out of her eye. She woke up the defendant
and he put the deceased back onto the bed and sent Sheila to get help.
The defendant's account of the night's events differed somewhat. He
claimed that the deceased had returned, with her lips and eyes swollen
and in a drunken condition,47 to her apartment where the defendant was
staying. He took her into the bathroom and slapped her on the back a
few times in an effort to make her "heave." She fell to the floor and he
dragged her to a bed and removed her clothes. The stench of alcohol from
the deceased became too much for the defendant and so he left her on
the bed and went into another room. Later, aroused by a commotion,
he returned and discovered the deceased lying on the floor. She tried to
get up but fell against a chest. Defendant then noticed blood running
out of her ear. Defendant denied that he had hit or kicked the deceased,
but he did admit that he might have "stepped on partial (sic) of her
body."'

8

The deceased died five days later without having regained consciousness.

40

The court quickly disposed of defendant's contention that the evidence
called for an instruction on manslaughter by stating:
Cheatham does not claim justifiable homicide, there was no
evidence of provocation, and he does not claim that he accidentally
killed her. If he was guilty at all he was guilty of murder and there
46. Defendant was the father of three of deceased's five children. The opinion
does not disclose if he was the father of Sheila.
47. State's witnesses testified that when they left the deceased outside of the
apartment she was neither drunk nor bruised.

48. 340 S.W.2d at 18.

49. The major portion of the opinion deals with the question of the sufficiency
of the evidence as to the cause of death and holds that the post-mortem examina-

tion and report was admissible into evidence over an objection that it was hearsay.
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was no circumstance or evidence demanding an instruction on
manslaughter.50
The decision affirming the conviction may well be correct. However,
the quoted paragraph does not reveal the reasoning involved in the rejection of the defendant's claim on the manslaughter instruction. It does
nothing more than to state that the defendant's contention is without merit.
It is clear that there was no evidence showing justification nor adequate
provocation. But does the statement that the defendant does not claim
accident cover all the other possibilities of finding manslaughter? If the
jury believed the defendant's account would it be possible for them to
find that he killed the deceased but did not intend to kill her nor to
cause serious bodily harm? If so, would this not be either manslaughter by
culpable negligence or accidental, excusable homicide? It is true that the
defendant did not claim that he accidentally killed her, but this is because
he claimed that he did not kill her at all. The court seems to say that
he is not entitled to an instruction on manslaughter unless he admits the
killing but claims that it was accidental. But it is the duty of the trial
court to instruct on "all questions of law," not just those consistent with
the defendant's theoryY'
It may well be that there was no evidence upon which the jury could
believe the defendant and still find that he caused the death,r2 or that
there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find culpable negligence, "
or that the question was not properly raised on appeal," or that in a

50. 340 S.W.2d at 18.
51. There is also the possibility of finding manslaughter from the failure
of the defendant to provide medical assistance to the deceased. This would depend
upon whether or not the defendant had a legal duty to the deceased to provide
such. Cf. People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907). See PERKINS,
op. ct. supra note 9, at 513; HALL, op. cit. supra note 44, at 208-11.
52. It is highly unlikely that the jury could believe Sheila's account (plus
the other evidence of the state) and not find that the defendant either intended
to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm, either of which is a sufficient mental state
for murder.
53. "The culpability necessary to support a manslaughter charge must be
so great as to indicate a reckless or utter disregard of human life." State v. Feger,
supra note 43, at 721.
54. "There is no evidence to the effect 'that the deceased pushed the defendant and at such time the defendant grabbed her while she was in a drunken
and intoxicated condition and she . . . thereafter fell on and near objects which
could have caused her death' as asserted in one of his assignments of error." State
v. Cheatham, supra note 48, at 18.
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close case due deference should be given to the decision of the trial court
not to instruct on manslaughter."5
The difficulty with the opinion is that it merely states the result
without explanation. This, unfortunately, seems to be a rather common
way of dealing with manslaughter.
The last of this grisly quartet is State v. Foster.6 As in the prior
case, the defendant was charged with the murder of a woman with whom
he had been living but to whom he was not married. Here, however, he
admitted the killing but claimed that it was accidental. According to the
defendant, he was repairing his shotgun which had been jamming. The
deceased returned to the apartment and after a discussion as to whether
the defendant should go hunting on the following Sunday, defendant began
putting the gun back together and as he did, it went off killing the
deceased.
A son of the deceased, but not of the defendant,57 testified that he
heard his mother say, "Don't point it, it might go off" and the defendant
reply that he did not care. According to the boy, he then told the deceased
to "look at the barrel" and then that he was going to kill her. This was
followed by the sound of the gun discharging.
On appeal the defendant claimed that the trial court had erred in
instructing on "voluntary" manslaughter, and in failing to instruct on
"involuntary" manslaughter. The manslaughter statute in Missouri makes
no distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Evidently,
the court gave an instruction on manslaughter from an intentional killing,
that is, a homicide in the heat of passion brought on by adequate provocation, but did not give an instruction on an unintentional killing by culpable negligence. It is clear that there was no evidence to support a finding
of adequate provocation and the instruction on intentional manslaughter
should not have been given. It is equally clear that there was evidence
to support a finding of culpable negligence from the reckless handling of
a dangerous weapon. But on this point no instruction was given.
Nevertheless, the conviction of manslaughter was affirmed by the
55. But cf. State v. Davis, 328 S.W.2d 706 (Mo. 1959), reversing conviction
of murder for failure to give instruction on manslaughter by reason of a killing in
heat of passion brought on by adequate provocation where defendant's testimony
indicated that he was not in the heat of passion.
56. 338 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1960).
57. Defendant was the father of one of deceased's three children.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/6
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Supreme Court. Like most opinions in this area, the decision is not a
5
model of clarity. 1

If the jury found that the defendant intended to kill the deceased,
they should have convicted of murder. They were erroneously told that
if they found an intent to kill they could return a verdict of guilty of
manslaughter. As indicated in the discussion above this type of error cannot be a ground for reversal of a conviction of manslaughter."
But here there is the additional factor that the jury should have been
instructed on manslaughter by culpable negligence, and normally, this
failure to instruct will be reversible error. However, here, according to
the court, there was no harm to the defendant by reason of this omission
of the trial court.
The trial court did instruct on murder, manslaughter,60 and death by
accident. The jury did not find murder. If they had found accident they
would have acquitted. 61 Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the
homicide was not murder, nor was it justifiable or excusable, and therefore it must be manslaughter as this is the only type of homicide left.
In other words, the jury may have found the defendant guilty of a
type of homicide (intentional killing in heat of passion) as to which there
was no evidence, and the jury was not instructed as to a type of homicide
58. For example, the court at 338 S.W.2d 896 distinguishes voluntary manslaughter as "the intentional killing of another," and involuntary manslaughter
as "the unintentional killing of another while doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony." The court then states, "By definition alone Foster's conduct
does not fall within the latter definition." The citation for the definitions was
40 C.J.S. Homicide §§ 40, 55 and 57. The definition of involuntary manslaughter
in C.J.S. § 55 includes an unintentional killing "in doing a lawful act negligently"
in addition to the doing of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony. Involuntary
manslaughter is usually defined as all manslaughter which is not voluntary manslaughter and clearly includes a killing by culpable negligence. See PERKINS, op. Cit.
sflpra note 9, at 56. The court's apparent elimination of the homicides by culpable
negligence from the category of involuntary manslaughter creates only more confusion in an already confused area and certainly does not aid in understanding the
reasoning of the opinion.
59. Supra pp. 7-13.
60. It is not clear whether in addition to giving an instruction on manslaughter from an intentional killing, the court gave a general instruction that
manslaughter is all those homicides which are not murder nor justifiable nor
excusable.
61. "Here the only issue was whether Foster accidentally killed Louise or
whether he intentionally shot her." State v. Foster, supra note 56, at 896. This
ignores completely the possibility of manslaughter by culpable negligence, unless
the court by "accidentally" means "unintentionally," which judging by their prior
use of the word "accident," e.g., "the defense of accidental killing" in the preceding
sentence, they definitely did not.
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(unintentional killing by culpable negligence) as to which there was
sufficient evidence. Apparently there is nothing wrong with this irregularity
since both of these types of homicide are called "manslaughter," and
therefore the defendant is in no position to complain.
The only possible effect of an instruction on culpable negligence
would have been to reduce the offense from second degree murder
62
to manslaughter and the jury has mercifully done that.
While such a result fits very well the conception of manslaughter as
the grab-bag of homicides, it is doubtful if it fits well with either the
letter or the spirit of the requirement that the court must instruct the
jury "upon all questions of law necessary for their guidance."
Although this discussion has been critical of some portions of the
four cases considered, its purpose has not been criticism of these particular cases but rather to point out by these examples the inadequacy of
the court's present approach to manslaughter. All four of the cases discussed are supported by prior decisions (some almost identical) of the
Missouri Supreme Court. What is objected to is the tendency of these
and the prior cases to base the decisions on conclusions of law which
masquerade as reasons or admittedly illogical rules which do not necessarily bear any relationship to a properly conceived and consistent approach
to the problem of criminal homicide.
It is sometimes useful to say that manslaughter is those homicides
which are not murder nor justifiable nor excusable homicide. But it should
be remembered that this is only the inverse statement of the proposition
that all homicides are either murder, manslaughter, justifiable or excusable and means only that our classification of homicides is all-inclusive.
It is not a definition of murder, manslaughter, justifiable or excusable
63
homicide.
It is, of course, possible to make a negative definition out of this formula by defining murder, excusable and justifiable homicide in other
terms, and then say that all other homicides are, by definition, manslaughter.
It is this negative approach (embodied in the statutory definition) that
has caused much of the difficulty in instructions on manslaughter. For
62. State v. Foster, supra note 56, at 896.
63. A similar concept is the accounting equation, A (assets) = L (liabilities)
+ N (net worth). This can be stated as N = A- L, or L = A- N. No matter
what form it takes it does not amount to a definition of assets, liabilities, or net
worth.
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while this may, by a rather complex process, tell us what homicides are
manslaughter, it is not much help in determining what are the characteristics of the crime of manslaughter.
It is possible to define manslaughter in other terms, just as malice,
4
the essential ingredient of murder, has been broken down into categories.1
The unsatisfactory analysis of common law manslaughter has
quite naturally carried over into the statutory law relating to that
offense and in the courts' interpretation of it. No material relief
can be expected until there is a critical reexamination of the offense
and a determination of the fundamental principles which support,
or should support, the crime. As in the case of murder, this can
best be accomplished by dividing the types of acts constituting the
offense into categories. Then the characteristics of each category
can be pointed up and subjected to challenge.
With that in mind, the types of unlawful homicide constituting common law manslaughter have been divided into three categories:
(1) Homicide resulting from an intention to kill or to do grievous bodily harm, which would be murder but for some sort of
extenuating circumstances.
(2) Unintentional homicide resulting from criminal negligence.
(a) Unintentional homicide while engaged in an act so dangerous as to indicate reckless indifference to human life and safety.
(b) Unintentional homicide resulting from the criminally
negligent omission to perform a legal duty owed another.
(3) Unintentional homicide occurring in the commission of
65
a misdemeanor or other unlawful act, dangerous in itself.
This analysis is merely a statement of the categories of manslaughter
at common law. It is possible that not all of these should be manslaughter
today.66 However, it is impossible to work out satisfactorily the problem
of defining manslaughter without such a breakdown for a beginning.
It is now possible for a court to instruct a jury that if they do not
find the homicide to be murder nor a form of innocent homicide, they may
return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter, even though there is nothing
64. See note 36 supra.
65. MORELAND, op. ct. siupra note 20, at 63.
66. For example see the recently enacted criminal codes of Illinois and Wisconsin, both of which define manslaughter and eliminate the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule (the third category above): Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.05 and 940.06
(1955). ILL. REV. STAT. §§ 9-2 and 9-3 (S.H.A. ch. 38) (1961).
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in the case to indicate any possibility of manslaughter. And for the court
67
to do so is not reversible error.
This is an indication that the law of homicide in Missouri in 1961

is not satisfactory and needs reexamination.

67. Cf. State v. Morrow, 188 S.W. 75, 76 (Mo. 1916):
Manifestly, however, there is no evidence of involuntary manslaughter in
the case, and, since defendant was convicted of this offense, it may be urged
that the point made in the motion for a new trial touching the lack of
evidence to uphold the verdict of manslaughter ought to be sustained.
Upon the record before us defendant was either guilty of murder in the
second degree, or he should have been acquitted on the ground of selfdefense. The instruction for manslaughter, as we say above, should not
have been given, for there is no manslaughter in any degree in the case;
but since the court so instructed and the jury saw fit to temper justice
with mercy, and since we are forbidden to reverse a case where the
evidence shows defendant to be guilty of a higher degree of crime than
that of which he was convicted . . . we have no lawful excuse for interfering.
The two cases cited by the court for support of this admittedly somewhat illogical
conclusion were State v. Todd, 194 Mo. 377, 92 S.W. 674 (1906) and State v.
Whitsett, 232 Mo. 511, 134 S.W. 555 (1911). Both of these cases affirmed convictions of second degree murder after a trial on a charge of first degree murder.
The facts of both were such that there was evidence to support a finding of second
degree murder.
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